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architectural models for the issuance of e-banknotes.
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2. THE E-BANKNOTE: CAN A ‘DIGITAL COIN’ BE A ‘BANKNOTE’?
A. What Is a banknote?
B. ‘Digital Coins’ and ‘Digital Currency’ – What Are They?
C. Does a Digital Coin Fall Into the Definition of a ‘Banknote’?
D. Does the Digital Coin Fulfil the Function of a ‘Banknote’?
E. The Digital Coin as an E-Banknote: Monetary Law and the History of the
Banknote
3. POTENTIAL TECHNICAL DESIGNS OF E-BANKNOTE SCHEMES
A. Introduction




ABSTRACT: The article discusses whether an electronic banknote is a ‘banknote’. The issue 
is dealt with as a matter of general statutory interpretation in the context of evolving
technologies and institutional arrangements. The article proposes a clear terminology to 
address concepts underlying digital currencies and access to central bank money and argues 
that a banknote may be ‘written’ electronically. The article is critical of both account-based
Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and cryptocurrencies and highlights features of non-
blockchain token-based alternatives. It sheds light on considerations affecting the selection of









      
  
     
    
    
  
  
    
   
 




   
 
    
   
   





    
    
   
 
 
       
      
 
 




   
 
 
4. ARCHITECTURE AND ISSUANCE MODELS
A. Introduction
B. Issuance (and Redemption) Options
(i) Full direct option
(ii) Limited direct option
(iii) Hybrid intermediated option





‘Money’ is broadly defined to consist of anything widely circulating as a medium of
exchange so as to be accepted ‘in final discharge of debts … without reference to the
character or credit of the person who offers it and without the intention of the person
who receives it to consume it … .’1 A national modern monetary system is controlled 
by the state and yet linked to private deposit banking. Standard monetary objects
consist of coins2 issued by the state and banknotes issued by the central bank, both
denominated in the official unit of account. Most payments, at least in volume, are
made over the non-cash payment system premised on the use of ‘scriptural money.’
Its architecture is centralised. Thereunder, a commercial bank 3 maintains deposit
accounts for customers, against a fractional reserve, which at least large banks hold in
settlement accounts with the central bank. 4 Monetary value held in deposit with
1 Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111, 116.  See also Reference Re Alberta Statutes [1938] SCR 100,
116, as well as Johnson v State 52 So. 652 (Ala, 1910) and State v Finnegean 103 NW 155 (Iowa 
1905)
2 Nowadays, coins represent only a subsidiary form of cash, the issuance of which has 
traditionally been left to the Treasury or a body closely linked to it (eg the Mint)
3 Throughout this article, ‘commercial bank’ or ‘bank’ is loosely used to mean a regulated
entity carrying out a substantial aspect of the ‘banking business’, which is to be 






   
     
    
   
 
   
 
 











     
   
   
 




   
   
 
 
     
   
   
     
commercial banks and redeemable to banknotes and coins is known as ‘commercial
bank money’ (CoBM). Monetary value held in deposit with the central bank, as well
as banknotes issued by the central bank is called central bank money (CeBM),
representing a liability of the central bank to the depositor or holder. 
For several years now, against the background of private actors commencing to issue 
private digital currencies, 5 a growing number of central banks 6 have been
investigating the possibility and implications of issuing a digital form CeBM for the
general public: central bank digital currency (CBDC), also known as retail CBDC
(rCBDC).7 
4 Large banks also hold deposits for correspondent small banks. On moving away from this
tiering structure see eg Evangelos Benos, Gerardo Ferrara, and Pedro Gurrola-Perez, ‘The 
impact of de-tiering in the United Kingdom’s large-value payment system’ (2017) Bank of




5Prominent schemes are Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ether, and Ripples. Many are listed in ‘List of
Cryptocurrencies’ (Wikipedia, last edited 2 November 2020)
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cryptocurrencies> accessed 7 November 2020.  See 
analysis by Saifedean Ammous, ‘Can Cryptocurrencies Fulfil the Functions of Money?’
(2016) Columbia University, Center on Capitalism and Society Working Paper No 92
<https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=898031068069020013084100094001115113024 
00804906803> accessed 7 November 2020
6 Most recently, see European Central Bank, ‘Report on a Digital Euro’ (October 2020)
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf> 
accessed 7 November 2020; See also Bank of England, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency: 




November 2020; Bank of Canada, ‘Contingency Planning for a Central Bank Digital
Currency’ (February 2020) <https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/02/contingency-planning-
central-bank-digital-currency/> accessed 7 November 2020
7 See the most recent overviews at Raphael Auer, Giulio Cornelli, and Jon Frost, ‘Taking
Stock: Ongoing Retail CBDC Projects’ (2020) BIS Quarterly Review, March 2020, 97-98 <
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2003z.htm> accessed 7 November 2020; Christian 
Barontini and Henry Holden, ‘Proceeding with Caution – A Survey on Central Bank Digital
Currency’ (2019) BIS Monetary and Economic Department, BIS Paper No 101 <







   
     
     
   
    
    




   
  





   
    
  
   
 
    
  
 
   
 
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
    
 
8 
At the moment, the banknote is the only CeBM available to the public. Legislation
conferring on central banks the power to issue banknotes, which are accorded the
status of legal tender,8 is common across the world. Such is the case eg in the United
Kingdom under s. 1 of the Currency and Bank Notes Act 1954,9 in the United States
under s. 16(1) of the Federal Reserve Act10 (in conjunction with s. 102 of the Coinage
Act11), in Canada under s. 25(1) of the Bank of Canada Act12 (in conjunction with s. 8(1)
of the Currency Act)13 as well as in the European Union under Article 128 TFEU.14 
Henry Holden, and Amber Wadsworth, ‘Impending Arrival – A Sequel to the Survey on
Central Bank Digital Currency’ (2020) BIS Monetary and Economic Department, BIS Paper
No 107 < https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap107.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020;
George Calle and Daniel Eidan, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency: An Innovation in Payments’
(2020) (r3 White paper) < https://www.r3.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/r3_CBDC_report.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020; Central Bank
Digital Currencies Working Group, ‘Key Aspects Around Central Bank Digital Currencies: 
Policy Report’ (2019) CEMLA Fintech Forum < https://www.cemla.org/fintech/docs/2019-06-
KeyAspectsAroundBankDigitalCurrencies.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020;
Johannes Duong, ‘Overview of Central Bank Digital Currency – State of Play’ (2020) SURF
Policy Note, Issue No 158 < https://www.suerf.org/policynotes/12575/overview-of-central-
bank-digital-currency-state-of-play> accessed 7 November 2020
Euro Legal Tender Expert Group, ‘Report of the Euro Legal Tender Expert Group
(ELTEG) on the Definition, Scope and Effects of Legal Tender of Euro Banknotes and Coins’ 
(2009) 4 <https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/documents/elteg_en.pdf> 
accessed 7 November 2020, defined the term by reference to  mandatory acceptance in full 
face value in the discharge of debts.
9 1954 (2 and 3 Eliz 2 c 12)
10 1913, c 6, 38 Stat 251 (US)
11 1965, Pub L No 89-81, 79 Stat 254 (US)
12 RSC, 1985, c B-2 (CA)
13 RSC, 1985, c C-52 (CA)








     
    
 
   
     
   
   
    
  
   
     
     





    
    
    
  
    
   
  
  
   
 
      
 





       
   
    
 
Part 2 examines whether an e-banknote is a ‘banknote’ from a combined historical,
functional, and linguistic perspective. Part 3 examines potential complying designs
for an e-banknote, taking into account publicly available information on technology. 
Part 4 addresses complying architecture and issuance models in the context of existing
institutional arrangements. The article concludes that a token-based e-banknote is
indeed a ‘banknote’, so that central banks with banknote issuing power could and
should address the optimal design and architecture. Questioning the suitability of
cryptocurrencies, the article expresses a preference for a centrally issued design, 
particularly where it is based on quantum-grade randomness and available offline in 
emergencies. Regardless, an architecture under which both distribution and transfers
of an e-banknote issued by the central bank are run by commercial banks appears to 
be the most advantageous.
Four contributions of the article are to be specifically noted. First, the article proposes
a clear terminology to address concepts underlying digital currencies and access to
CeBM. Second, we argue that a banknote may be ‘written’ electronically. Third, in 
examining designs, the article breaks away from the current shallow debate that
effectively limits digital currencies to cryptocurrencies and makes a case for selecting
a design that is appropriate from both a functional and legal perspective. Fourth, we
point at the way monetary laws have been interpreted in the past as a general guide.
In the final analysis, our interpretation aims at providing firm foundations to the e-
banknote as an evolutionary rather than revolutionary concept, so as to align it with
existing constitutional and legal frameworks.   
Invariably, all such legislation was passed when a banknote was printed on paper.
This article explores the question of whether, in principle, an electronic or digital
banknote (‘e-banknote’) is a ‘banknote’ falling within the ambit of such legislation.15 
It addresses the question as a matter of general statutory interpretation, not linked to 
a specific legal system, in the context of technologies and institutional arrangements.
2 The E-Banknote: Can a ‘Digital Coin’ Be a ‘Banknote’?
A. What Is a Banknote
15 This will be in line with the observation in ECB, ‘Digital Euro Report’ (n 6) 25, albeit with
no real analysis, that ‘the right to issue “euro banknotes” could be understood to encompass
the right to determine the format or medium of “euro banknotes” so as to have them issued






    
 
    
    
     
     
    
   
    
    
   
 
     
 








        
     
     




        
 
     
   
 
     




     
   
   
    
Not being defined by statute, the banknote is universally recognised as an
unconditional promise in writing signed by a banker, engaging to pay on demand a
sum certain in money to the bearer, being the holder in possession who presents it for
payment. As it is transferrable from one person to another by delivery, free of claims
and defences, the banknote is a negotiable instrument.16 The promise to pay may,
however, be implicit by the mere specification of the sum ‘payable’ on the banknote.17 
At present, banknotes are typically issued by central banks on either paper or polymer
and constitute legal tender. Each is counterfeit-resistant and bears a serial number that
distinguishes it from any other - even of the same value. The promise to pay is a mere
formality,18 as convertibility to precious metal coins or specie is banned so that the
instrument is ‘perpetually renewable’.19 
Over the centuries, the banknote has been transformed. Having evolved from a
genuine promise of a commercial banker to pay money to become legal tender,
inconvertible, and hence a ‘sterile’ obligation of a central bank, the banknote
continuously adapted to changing economic, technological, and institutional
conditions.20 
B. ‘Digital Coins’ and ‘Digital Currency’ – What Are They?
16 See eg DAL Smout, Chalmers on Bills of Exchange (13th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) 274; AW
Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange (7th edn, Canada Law Book 1969) 127; 
Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (6th edn, OUP 2005) 25. A leading case is
Banco de Portugal v Waterlow and Sons, Ltd [1932] AC 452 (HL) 483, 487 (and as to the
promise, see also 478, 480). Whether negotiable instruments legislation applies to the
banknote is outside the scope of the present discussion.
17 Banco de Portugal (n 16) 487. For the form of the notes involved in that case see eg 460, 480.
18 For viewing the promissory language as ‘merely ornamental’, see RG Hawtrey, ‘The
Portuguese Banknote Case’ (1932) 42 Economic Journal 392, 395 
19 Banco de Portugal (n 16) 508. See also Article 3(2) of the Decision of the European Central
Bank of 13 December 2010 on the issue of euro banknotes (ECB/2010/29) [2011] OJ L35/26, on
holders’  right to have a euro banknote exchanged at a National Central Bank for other
banknotes of the same face value.
20 For a historical discussion see Benjamin Geva, The Payment Order of Antiquity and the
Middle Ages: A Legal History (Hart: Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2011) Chs 8, 10,11. See also
Helmut Siekmann, ‘Deposit Banking and the Use of Monetary Instruments’ in David Fox






      



















       
   
 
 
    






   
  
       
 
 
    
   
    
  
As a token representing value, 21 the electronic or digital22 coin is a distinct entity 
consisting of data in the form of a unique string of bits. ‘This string must have a
numeric value, and must have an identity’. 23 Like physical coins and banknotes,
digital coins are not paid out of bank accounts, so that their payment does not appear
to require intermediation by banks. And yet, exactly as electronic funds transfers, they
are paid over the cyber space. Each digital coin may be in the form of a total unspent 
amount in a wallet24 or, as will be seen below, to one degree or another, a digital
representation of what otherwise would be a distinct physical banknote.
Digital currency is an assortment of digital coins or, more specifically, a system under
which digital coins are issued, transferred, and redeemed. A privately issued digital
currency may have its own unit of account, fluctuating by reference to the value of an
official unit of account, in which case it is self-anchored. Alternatively, it may be a
‘claim-check’ or stablecoin, either in a unit of account of an official currency or in the
value of a specific commodity, whether or not it is backed by a reserve of such
currency or commodity.25 
21 Practically, ‘with properties that suffice to attest to and transfer ownership’:  Digital Dollar
Foundation and Accenture, ‘The Digital Dollar Project: Exploring a US CBDC’ (2020) 10
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e16627eb901b656f2c174ca/t/5ecfc542da96fb2d2d5b5f 
15/1590674759958/Digital-Dollar-Project-Whitepaper_vF.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020
(where the quoted language is part of the definition itself).
22 We do not argue that ‘electronic’ and ‘digital’ are identical terms. However, in the present 
context, they are used interchangeably, with the use of ‘digital’ being substantially more 
prominent.
23 Gideon Samid, Tethered Money: Managing Digital Currency Transactions (Elsevier Academic
Press 2015) 105.
24 Such a coin exists only as ‘an identifiable address with a balance’. See Corinne Zellweger-
Gutknecht, ‘Developing the Right Regulatory Regime for Cryptocurrencies and other Value
Data’ in David Fox and Sarah Green (eds), Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law (OUP
2019) 57 , 86 n 160 
25 Samid, Tethered Money (n 23) 108. For risks created by global privately issued stablecoins,
see Anastasia Melachrinos and Christian Pfister, ‘Stablecoins: A Brave New World?’ (2020)
Banque de France Working Paper No 757 <https://publications.banque-








      
 
      
  
      
   
 
    
 




   




     
  
   
      
     
   
 








   
We find alternative definitions to be unsatisfactory. For example, Bitcoin mythological
founder Satoshi Nakamoto defined an electronic coin as ‘a chain of digital signatures’
through which ‘[e]ach owner transfers the coin to the next’. 26 This defines more the
mechanism under which the coin is transferred than the ‘coin’ itself, and yet envisions
the latter as a discrete object. In a similar vein, definitions that focus on ‘digital
representations of value,’27 are inadequate. They include account-based products in
which the balance is expressed digitally28 and are thus too broad. Such definitions
cover monetary value credited to an account. In the digital age, unless qualified,29 they
also encompass credit posted to commercial bank accounts accessible from a digital
device. Equally broad is a definition under which digital currency consists of
‘[m]onetary value stored electronically that is accepted as a means of payment and
whose use is neither based on nor requires funds in a deposit or credit account in a
26 Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008) 2
<https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020
27 Dong He, Karl Habermeier, Ross Leckow, et al, ‘Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial 
Considerations’ (2016) IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/16/03, 8
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020; 
Kiff et al, ‘A Survey of Research on Retail Central Bank Digital Currency’ (2020) IMF
Working Paper No 20/104, 5 <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2020/06/26/A-
Survey-of-Research-on-Retail-Central-Bank-Digital-Currency-49517> accessed 7 November
2020. See also European Central Bank, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes – A Further Analysis
(2015) 25<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf> 
accessed 7 November 2020. These are definitions for ‘virtual currencies’ – a term used (in a
sense other than game-currency) to denote what we consider ‘digital currencies’. See also in
the United States: the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Business Act, drafted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved and
recommended for enactment in all the States at its Annual Conference Meeting in its One-
Hundred-And-Twenty-Sixth Year, San Diego, California July 14 - July 20, 2017, section 
102(23).
28 Indeed, the IMF Taxonomy Figure in He et al, ‘Virtual Currencies’ (n 27) 8 specifically
covers Pay-pal and e-money balances.
29 Among the three sources cited in n 11, at least the first two qualify it in a way that 






      
      
  
    
 
 
    
   
    
    
 
   
  
    
 
     
 
   
 
  






       





       
     
 
      
 
       
       
  
financial institution’. 30 A balance-based ‘electronic money’ product, 31 issued by a
 network. Depending on its design,
connectivity may be over the Internet or a telecommunication carrier. A centralised 
protocol may further necessitate the intermediation of either an operator of a central
switch or a custodian acting as a virtual store or warehouse person for the coins.
commercial bank, falls into this definition. However, its record, accessible from a
device without resort to the bank’s computer system, can be viewed as premised on a 
decentralised bank account.32 As such, it is a type of account-based product and not a
digital coin.
A digital currency scheme means a system under which digital coins are issued,
transferred, and redeemed. The rules under which such system operates constitute its
protocol. We distinguish three schemes of digital currencies. A scheme under which
a digital currency is issued, transferred, and redeemed over a distributed ledger is
decentralised. Conversely, a scheme under which a digital currency is issued,
transferred, and redeemed over a centralised ledger is centralised. Finally, a digital 
currency transferable under a decentralised protocol – such as over a distributed 
ledger and yet issued centrally – is hybrid.33 
A centralised protocol (just like a decentralised protocol) does not depend on the
intermediation of bank accounts and is thus entirely different from a centralised 
architecture in account-balance payment systems. Furthermore, payment in digital
currency, made from one digital device to another, does not necessarily require the
intermediation of a dedicated electronic
30 Ben Fung, Scott Hendry, and Warren E Weber, ‘Canadian Bank Notes and
Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies’ (2017) BOC Staff Working Paper 2017-5 
<http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/swp2017-5.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2020
31 CPSS, Security of Electronic Money: Report by the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems and the Group of Computer Experts of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries
(Basle: BIS 1996) 5 <https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d18.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020
32 Alan L Tyree, ‘The Legal Nature of Electronic Money’ (1999) 10 JBFLP 273, 276.
33 For this tripartite classification, see He et al, ‘Virtual Currencies (n 27), where a third
criterion – on top of issuance and transfer – is added viz ‘mechanisms to implement and











    
 
   







    
   




    
   
  
 
   






   
   
     
     
    
 
Underlying decentralisation, the distributed ledger is an asset database that can be
shared across a network of multiple sites, geographies, or institutions. Blockchain is
an underlying technology, requiring the Internet to support and maintain its peer-to-
peer network that enables digital implementation of a distributed ledger. Being a
computerised ledger on a distributed network, it generates a single version of the
record on each computer. In essence it is:34 
‘a type of a database that takes a number of records and puts them in a block
… Each block is then “chained” to the next block, using a cryptographic
signature. This allows block chains to be used like a ledger, which can be shared
and corroborated by anyone with the appropriate permissions.’
Accuracy of the ledger is corroborated under a method determined under rules
adhered to by participants. Record security and visibility to authorised users is 
ensured by cryptography.
A ‘cryptocurrency’ denotes a digital currency in which encryption techniques are used
to regulate the generation of units of currency35 and verify the execution of payment
transactions on a decentralised network. 36 Cryptography is thus used in
34 UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, ‘Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Block
Chain’ (2016) Government Office for Science Report, 17 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020
35 This distinctive feature is unfortunately missing in UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, ‘Legal
Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts (2019) The LawTech Delivery Panel, paras
24-34 <https://35z8e83m1ih83drye280o9d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/6.6056_JO_Cryptocurrencies_Statement_FINAL_WEB_111119-
1.pdf>accessed 7 November 2020, where the focus (particularly in para 28) appears to be on 
the control of the asset (rather than on its generation) by cryptographic means.
36 This definition slightly modifies the one from The Wolf of Crypto, ‘Basic Cryptocurrency 
Starter Guide’ (Medium, 18 September 2017) <https://medium.com/@Wolfofcrypto/basic-
cryptocurrency-starter-guide-8f2071ea85de> accessed 7 November 2020. Specifically, we
replaced ‘transfer of funds’ by the ‘execution of payment transactions’ to point at payment 
by the transmission of ‘coins’ rather than ‘generic value’ in the forms of funds. See also
‘Cryptocurrency’ (Wikipedia, last edited 3 November 2020)
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptocurrency> accessed 7 November 2020, stating ‘[a]

















     
     
 
 
    
  
   









     
 
 
   
  
      




        
 
   
cryptocurrencies to express and protect the value of the coins (the sequence of the
bits), to prevent counterfeiting and fraudulent transactions as well as to perform
validation, execution, and recording. These functions are carried out on a distributed 
ledger, such as a blockchain. Thereon, each block contains a cryptographic hash or
algorithm that links it to the previous block, along with a timestamp for the
transactions from that block. The network allows online payments to be sent directly
from one party to another without going through a bank or any other account-holding
centralised counterparty.37 
It is argued that developers of cryptocurrencies ‘simply migrated the cryptographic
tools used to safeguard communication and applied them to safeguard digital
currency.’ Thus, the argument continues, such developers made cryptocurrencies
vulnerable to erosive cryptographic intractability. 38 Moreover, ‘some of the most
widespread cryptographic methods currently used in cybersecurity’ are likely to 
become exposed to successful attacks by quantum computers.39 This will undoubtedly 
undermine the integrity of cryptocurrencies. In the ongoing fight against
counterfeiters and fraudulent copiers, centralised schemes are better positioned to
apply superior defence measures to protect the integrity of the database as well as
enhanced security procedures in both coin and identity verification upon redemption
and in trade. 40 
exchange that uses strong cryptography to secure financial transactions, control the creation of
additional units, and verify the transfer of assets’ (emphasis added).
37 Not every decentralised system is that of a cryptocurrency. For a visual demonstration of
the point see He et al, ‘Virtual Currencies’ (n 27) 8, Figure 1. We do not adopt the taxonomy 
proposed by that figure.
38 Samid, Tethered Money (n 23) 26.
39 Sara Castellanos, ‘Visa, JPMorgan Are Already Preparing for Potential Quantum
Cyberattacks’ The Wall Street Journal (New York, 9 October 2020) 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/visa-jpmorgan-are-already-preparing-for-potential-quantum-
cyberattacks-11602255213> accessed 7 November 2020
40 See eg Samid, Tethered Money (n 27) 92-94 and cf 125-27, as well as 25, 98-100, albeit
focusing on the advantage of paying with digital coins over that of paying in scriptural






    
 
  
    
   
 









    




    
 










   
  




     
   
Bit-minted money is proposed as the answer to these drawbacks. Unlike a
cryptocurrency, bit-minted money is not hinged on a mathematical riddle that even
as it cannot be solved at present, may be solved in the future. Rather, bit-minted 
money, while utilised in schemes using crypto tools for messaging and storage, is
fitted on a completely different foundation, thriving to randomness41 - also known as
quantum or pure randomness, premised on unpredictability.42 
C. Does a Digital Coin Fall Into the Definition of a ‘Banknote’?
The feasibility of paper money is ‘associated with the two Sinic inventions of paper
and printing’. 43 An ongoing process of improving printing, enhancing security
features, and replacing paper by polymer, facilitated by technological advances, has
been precipitated by a search for more savings and convenience as well as confidence,
safety, and security.44 
Throughout its evolution, the banknote has remained ‘written’, even as the meaning
of ‘written’ has expanded to cover printed, stamped, embossed and in theory also
engraved.45 At the same time, we argue, the ‘writing’ requirement has been functional.
41 For the superior protection of randomness premised on ‘a cipher which use[s] no
mathematical complexity but instead call[s] for large amounts of randomness’ see eg 
Carsten Stöcker, ‘Randomness: The Fix for Today’s Broken Security’ (Medium, 9 November
2017) <https://medium.com/@cstoecker/randomness-the-fix-for-todays-broken-security-
39ea7dc3a89b> accessed 7 November 2020
42 ibid
43 AJ Toynbee, A Study of History (Abridgement of Volumes VII-X by DC Somervell, OUP
1957) 62
44 See in general Don Cleveland IBNS LM-136A, ‘History of Printed Money’ 
<https://www.theibns.org/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=251&Ite 
mid=127> accessed 7 November 2020; more specifically on existing security features see Jeff 
Desjardin, ‘10 Banknotes From Around the World, and Their Security Features” (Visual 
Capitalist, 18 June 2018) <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/10-banknotes-around-world-
security-features/> accessed 7 November 2020; as well as Giesecke & Devrient, ‘Security
Features for Staying One Step Ahead of the Counterfeiters’ (Bankenoteinfo)
<http://banknoteinfo.net/security-features/> accessed 7 November 2020
45 For example, under Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 (UK) ch 30, ‘writing’







   
   
   




   
    
   
   
   
   
   
  
  
     
  
 
    
 
   
 
 
    
   
   
 
 
   
 
     
  
  
   






In the case of the banknote, it is premised on the need to have a record, both as a
matter of evidence to secure attribution, permanence, integrity, and authenticity, as
well as to facilitate simple transferability. Once technology allows these functions to
be performed through a novel medium, as is the case with the digital coin, there is no
longer a reason to insist on the written format more than on the existence of a genuine
obligation to pay metallic money. The accommodation to a changed environment
ought not to be limited to the nature of the obligation and bypass the media.
The definition of a banknote46 does not include an independent requirement of being 
a tangible object. 47 Rather, the tangibility feature derives from the ‘writing’
requirement as envisioned prior to the electronic age. At that time, there was no way
of ‘writing’ on an intangible media; writing in the air was (and is) meaningless.
However, with new technologies, it has become possible to write on something
intangible. We write an email much the same as we write a postcard or a letter. What
paper or any other tangible media gives to writing is permanence – which
technologically can now be accorded to an intangible record in the cyberspace.
Accordingly, we argue, notwithstanding the fact that it is a uniquely generated item
of information and as such, an intangible, the digital coin may nevertheless be seen as
‘written’, or at least, functionally equivalent to ‘written’.
Liability on a banknote requires signature. Generally speaking, a ‘signature’ may be
written, lithographed, facsimiled or stamped on a document (or anything else tangible)
with the intent of authenticating liability on a contract. 48 The key is, however, a 
reproducing words in a visible form ...’. A creative interpretation may treat words in a
permanent record ‘visible’ on a computer screen as satisfying the writing requirements: Leif
Gamertsfelder, ‘Electronic Bills of Exchange: Will the Current Law Recognise Them?’ (1998)
21:2 UNSWLJ 566
46 See Subpart 2 (A)
47 Under UCC 1-201(43), ‘writing’ is defined to include ‘printing, typewriting, or any other
intentional reduction to tangible form.’ This is in contrast to UCC 1-201 (31), under which 
‘record’ is defined to mean ‘information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is 
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.’ It is 
recommended to revise UCC Article 4A by expanding ‘writing’ to include ‘medium stored
in an electronic or other medium and retrievable in perceivable form.’ Such a distinction is
for the purposes of the interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code. Nonetheless, it is












   
 
   
    
 
  
     
   
 









     
    
 
 
     
 
     
 
    
 
    
 





permanent record for the authentication of liability. Accordingly, the electronic
authentication of an electronic record that substitutes writing will satisfy the signature
requirement.
Observations to such ends were already made in the common law.49 In one case, the 
court did not doubt that ‘if a party creates and sends an electronically created
document then he will be treated as having signed it to the same extent that he would
in law be treated as having signed a hard copy of the same document.’50 In another
case, the court considered an email as written.51 
Accordingly, a claim-check digital coin, being a claim to a specified ‘quantity’
denominated in the official unit of account, falls into the definition of a banknote. This
is true as long as the signatory issuing bank is unconditionally liable to pay to the
bearer on demand a sum certain in the stated fiat money.  Moreover, the claim check
digital currency must fulfil the function of a ‘banknote’ as discussed below.
D. Does the Digital Coin Fulfil the Function of a ‘Banknote’?
As a negotiable instrument, the paper banknote is both a chattel and obligation, or
else, it is both a chose in possession and a chose in action.52 As a ‘document in which 
a right is incorporated in such a way that it cannot be claimed nor transferred to 
others ...without the document’ it can be theorised on the same basis as the Germanic 
Wertpapier, 53 which would have fallen under Article 965 of the Swiss Code of
48 See eg Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking (n 16) 440-441, 443, 444
49 Simon Gleeson, The Legal Concept of Money (OUP 2018) 176 para 9.47.
50 Pereira Fernandes v Mehta [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 885 para 28
51 Golden Ocean Group v Salgocar Mining Industries [2012] EWCA Civ 265
52 Relating both to ‘a chattel, a tangible scrap of paper’ and ‘a bundle of contracts’, a claim to
a negotiable instrument thus involves not only ‘the right to possess a thing but [also] the 
right to sue several persons [liable to it]’: Zechariah Chaffee Jr, ‘Rights in Overdue paper’ 






   
  
 
         
     
 
   
 
 
    
   
   
 
   
 
 
     
        
   
 
 
   
     





    
   
    
 
    
 
        
 
 




      
Obligations.54 Stated otherwise, the obligation on a banknote (sterile as it is nowadays)
is embodied in the chattel, so as to inure to the benefit of the possessor of the chattel.
Indeed, the transfer of possession is a requirement to the transfer of title to – and hence 
payment in – money. 55 Accordingly, for the digital coin to function as a written
banknote, it must be not only be ‘signed’ and ‘written’, but also embodied in an object
of property, capable of being moved from the exclusive control of one person to that
of another.
As for the first characteristic, that of an object of property, common law recognises 
proprietary features of an intangible right even where it is not a chose in action, as
long as the right is ‘definable, identifiable by third parties[,] capable in its nature of
assumption by third parties and [has] some degree of permanence or stability.’ 56 
Accordingly, it was held that cryptocurrencies are to be treated as property. 57 
53 According to Denis V Cowen and Leonard Gering, The Law of Negotiable Instruments in
South Africa Vol. One: General Principles (5th edn, Juta 1985) 94, the word ‘wertpapier’ cannot
be well translated to English, so that words such as ‘security’ or ‘commercial paper’ do not
convey its accurate meaning.
54 Swiss Code of Obligations: English Translation of the Official Text (Swiss-American
Chamber of Commerce 2003). On the German Wertpapier, see in general L Dabin, Fondements 
du droit cambiaire Allemand (Faculté de droit de Université de Liège 1959). For a
comprehensive discussion on the German conceptual framework, and as to whether it sheds 
additional light on the nature of a negotiable instrument, see Cowen & Gering, Negotiable 
Instruments (n 53) 79-98, where a slightly different translation, albeit to the same effect, of the 
Swiss provision is reproduced at 82. Their negative conclusion as to whether the Wertpapier
sheds additional light on the nature of a negotiable instrument at 110 is criticised by JT
Pretorius' book review in (1986) 103 SALJ 151, 154-56. On the negotiable instrument as 
Wertpapier see also FR Malan, JT Pretorius, and SF Du Toit, Malan on Bills of Exchange, 
Cheques and Promissory Notes in South African Law (5th edn, LexisNexis 2009) 4, 7.
55 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008) paras 3.32-3.42.
56 National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 [1247]-[1248], [1965] 2 All ER 472 [494]
(HL, per Lord Wilberforce)
57 First in B2C2 Limited v Quoine PTE Ltd [2019] SGHC (I) 03 (Singapore International
Commercial Court) para 142; followed in AA v Persons [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm) para 61.
In reaching its conclusion, AA v Persons also treated the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, 
‘Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts’ (n 35) as persuasive and yet not being an authoritative 






   
    
    




     
   
  
   
 
     
 
 





    
   
   
      
     
     
   
     
 
    
     
 
    
    
     
  
 
   
 
    
    
  
  
Civilians may have been more dogmatic. 58 Nevertheless, drawing on Gaius’
distinction between res corporales and res incorporales, Nicholas maintains the existence
of ‘abstract things, such as a debt or a right of way’ that cannot be possessed and yet
can be owned.59 He concludes that the ‘the law of things includes all those rights
which are capable of being evaluated in money terms.’60 
The fulfilment of the second characteristic, that of transferability from hand to hand,
requires, first, an exploration of the mechanics of payment in digital currency and,
second, an assessment of the legal treatment of the mechanism. For its part, the
mechanics of payment in a digital coin depends on the specific design of the coin and
its underlying scheme. A common denominator for all mechanisms is the use of a
telecommunication network and the availability of a validating intermediary, 
designed to prevent double payment. To both such ends, several scenarios are
available:
1. Being in control of a digital coin ‘affixed’ to a single Internet domain, for which
it attorns to the payer. A ‘bailee’61 complies with the payer's instructions and 
executes them by attorning to the payee, thereby causing ‘possession’ in the
lesser extent, also paras 86–99). For mostly earlier scholarly discussion see David Fox, 
‘Cryptocurrencies in the Common Law of Property’ in Fox & Green, Cryptocurrencies (n 24)
139, 152-54 paras 6.38-6.41. See also Christopher Hare, ‘Cryptocurrencies and Banking Law: 
Are There Lessons to Learn?’ in Fox & Green, Cryptocurrencies (n 24) 229, 237 n 53; Gleeson,
The Legal Concept of Money (n 49) 166 para 9.10. Another discussion is by G A Walker,
‘Financial Technology Law - A New Beginning and a New Future’ (2016) 50:1 TIL 137. For
another perspective, see Sarah Jane Hughes, ‘Property, Agency, and the Blockchain: New
Technology and Longstanding Legal Paradigms’ (2019) 65 Wayne L Rev 57
58 See in detail eg Daniel Carr, ‘Cryptocurrencies as Property in Civilian and Mixed Legal
Systems’ in Fox & Green, Cryptocurrencies (n 24) 177
59 Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (Clarendon Press 1962) 106. Indeed,
‘incorporeal things’ are recognised by the Institutes: The Institutes (Book II Title II)
translation reproduced in RW Lee, The Elements of Roman Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell
1956) 114 and discussion at 110
60 ibid 98 (emphasis added)
61 We agree with the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, ‘Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts’ (n 35) 
paras 87-88 that strictly speaking no ‘bailment’ can exist with respect to a ‘digital banknote’, 








     
    
   
 











     
    
  
   
   
 
 
      




   
    
  
      
  
   
     
   
    
  
    
  
 
coin to be transferred from the payer to the payee. Alternatively, such a system
may be viewed as run by a central switch operator which, at the instruction of
the payer, transfers the control of the coin from the payer to that of the payee; 
62 
2. A ‘coin’ in the form of an unspent transaction output (UTXO)63 in the payer's 
wallet, reflecting earlier transactions, is transformed into a new UTXO in the
payee's wallet. Where the payer does not use up the entire UTXO, payment is
carried out by splitting the payer's UTXO into two UTXO's: one in the sum of
payment going to the payee's wallet, and the second in the amount of the
balance of the UTXO remaining in the payer's wallet.64 
62 This method of payment is put forward by WingCash, now Open Payment Network
(OPN):<https://wingcash.com/> and <https://openpaymentnetwork.us/, > both accessed 7
November 2020, discussed in Subpart 3(C).
63 The term is explained in eg ‘What’s a UTXO? A Guide to Unspent Transaction Output 
(UTXO)’ (Komodo, 26 July 2018) <https://komodoplatform.com/whats-utxo> accessed 7 
November 2020
64 This is eg Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin’ (n 26). See also eg Stuart Hoegner, ‘What is Bitcoin?’ in 
Stuart Hoegner (ed), The Law of Bitcoin (iUniverse 2015) 1; Neil Guthrie, ‘The End of Cash?
Bitcoin, the Regulators and the Courts’ (2014) 29 BFLR 355. For its mechanics, see Jonathan
Levin, ‘Bitcoin: New Plumbing for Financial Services’ (Coindesk, 29 November 2014),
<http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-new-plumbing-financial-services/> accessed 7 November
2020. See also Nicholas Wenker, ‘Online Currencies, Real-World Chaos: The Struggle to
Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin’ (2015) 19 Tex Rev L & Pol 145; Jacob Hamburger, ‘Bitcoins vs.
State Money Transmission Laws: Protecting Consumers or Hindering Innovation?’ (2015) 11 
J L Econ & Pol'y 229. See also ‘Bitcoin’ (Wikipedia, last edited 2 November 2020),
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin> accessed 7 November 2020; ‘What Is Bitcoin?’
(Coindesk, last edited 18 August 2020) <http://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-
bitcoin> accessed 7 November 2020; Benjamin Wallace, ‘The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin’ (Wired, 
23 September 2011) < https://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf-bitcoin/> accessed 7 November
2020; ‘Blockchains - The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things’ (The Economist, 31 October
2015) < https://www.economist.com/briefing/2015/10/31/the-great-chain-of-being-sure-
about-things> accessed 7 November 2020. See also ‘How bitcoin works’ (Wikipedia, last 












   
    
  
    
 
     
     
   
   
    
 




     
  
 
    






   
 
  
   
 
    
    
 
    
 
3. The payer sends from his or her device to the payee's device a ‘coin’ or any split
of it. The payee may (but is not required to) validate the coin authenticity with
the ‘mint’.65 
Payment under each scheme is premised on the transfer of control of the digital coin.
The functional equivalence with the transfer of possession of a paper banknote is
obvious. For example, in a case of digital coins accessed by keys, Fox speaks of a
presumption in favour of control by the public key holder as the ‘intangible analogue
of the familiar (…) presumption that possession is evidence of title’.66 
Undoubtedly, this principle guided the drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Transferable Records (2017) 67 (MLETR). Thereunder, Article 11 MLETR
treats ‘exclusive control of [an] electronic transferable record’ as a functional
equivalent of ‘the possession of a transferable document or instrument.’ ‘Transferable
document or instrument’ is defined in Article 2 MLETR to mean:
a document or instrument issued on paper that entitles the holder to claim the
performance of the obligation indicated in the document or instrument and to 
transfer the right to performance of the obligation indicated in the document 
or instrument through the transfer of that document or instrument.
In turn, Article 2 MLETR defines ‘electronic record’ to mean ‘information generated,
communicated, received or stored by electronic means’. 68 
Article 8 MLETR renders information that is ‘accessible so as to be usable for
subsequent reference’ the functional equivalent of ‘writing’. Similarly, MLETR’s 
Article 9 provides that where ‘a reliable method is used to identify [a] person and to
indicate that person's intention in respect of the information contained in [an]
65 This is BiMint, further discussed in Subpart 3(C)
66 David Fox, ‘Cryptocurrencies in the Common Law of Property’ in Fox & Green, 
Cryptocurrencies (n 24) 157 para 6.50
67 Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records, A 72/17, UNCITRAL, 2017
<https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-
documents/uncitral/en/mletr_ebook_e.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020










    
  
   
  
    
 
 
   
   
  
   
   




      
   
   
 
 















     
electronic transferable record’, a legal signature requirement by that person is
satisfied.
Article 11(1) MLETR goes on to provide that the ‘exclusive control of [an] electronic
transferable record’ established by ‘a reliable method’, which also identifies the
person in control, meets a legal requirement for ‘the possession of a transferable 
document or instrument’. Additionally, under Article 11(2) MLETR, ‘the transfer of
control over [an] electronic transferable record’ is the equivalent for the ‘transfer of
possession of a transferable document or instrument’.69 
Indeed, the banknote is a signed transferable document or instrument, entitling its
holder to claim from the signer the performance of an obligation indicated therein.
For its part, in a digitised form, the banknote is an electronic transferable record,
authenticated by an identified person, which is under the exclusive control of the one
entitled to enforce the obligation it contains. Transferability in the former format is by 
the physical delivery of the paper banknote, while transferability in the latter format
is by the transfer of control over the electronic record of the banknote.
In conclusion, a digital coin falling into the definition of a ‘banknote’ may fulfil the
function of a paper banknote. Its transferability to a bona fide transferee for value free
of any claim or defence is a quality to be accorded to it by the law.70 
E. The Digital Coin as an E-Banknote: Monetary Law and the History of the
Banknote
Throughout its history, the written banknote transformed in substance in response to
ongoing advancing technological conditions, changing market demand, and evolving
69 In this context, Article 15 of MLETR (n 67) provides that: ‘Where the law requires or
permits the endorsement in any form of a transferable document or instrument, that
requirement is met with respect to an electronic transferable record if the information
required for the endorsement is included in the electronic transferable record and that 
information is compliant with the requirements set forth in articles 8 and 9.’ This, however,
is irrelevant for the banknote, which is payable to the bearer and thus transferable by mere 
delivery. 






   
  
 
    
   
 
   
  
 
   
  
  
   
   
  
    
     
 
      
  




     
 
      
 
 
    
    
 
   
 
    
 
   
   
   
  
institutional frameworks. With technology facilitating the change in the media, the
move to digital is just another step in the same process.
The role of statutory law in the evolution of the banknote was not to lead, but rather
to facilitate, developments for societal benefit. Hence, statutes and constitutional
powers in relation to money ought to be interpreted in the spirit of accommodating
new developments, harnessing them for the protection of the public, but not hindering
them.
In England, for example, the law followed the emergence of banknotes, originally
issued in the course of the 17th century by goldsmiths as receipts for moneys deposited 
with them. 71 Even in the absence of an explicit note issuing power under its
establishing statute,72 the Bank of England began, shortly after its establishment, to 
issue to depositors, ‘probably to a very considerable extent’,73 notes payable to the
bearer.74 These were characterised by Lord Mansfield as ‘as much money, as guineas 
themselves are; or any other current coin, that is used in common payments, as money 
or cash’.75 The Bank of England notes were made legal tender by statute as late as
under s. 6 of the Bank of England Act, 1833.76 
For its part, the issuance of the banknote in the USA, first by practice then by statute,
bypassed a rigid interpretation of a federal constitutional power under Article 1
Section 8 of the US Constitution ‘to coin money’,77 which has been taken to give the
72 The Ways and Means Act 1694 (UK) 5 & 6 Will & Mar, c 20, s XIX
73 Bank of England v Anderson (1837), 3 Bing (NC) 589 [654], 132 ER 538 [562], per Tindal CJ
(CP)
74 JM Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (Reproduced by WM W 
Gaunt & Sons 1993, The Athlone Press 1955) 89-90
75 Miller (n 70)
76 (UK) 3 & 4 Will IV, c 98
77 For constitutional aspects of money issuance in the US see eg Thomas Wilson, The Power 
'to Coin' Money: The Exercise of Monetary Powers by the Congress (ME Sharpe 1992);  Ali Khan,
‘The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification’ (1999) Univ Cincinnati







   
      
   
   
   
 
 







     
   
  
        







      
 
    
   






       
      
 
      
 
   
power to issue only full-bodied metallic money.78 Market (and government) demands
were met by the issuance of banknotes, originally by state chartered banks with no
statutory basis, later by national banks, and finally by the Federal Reserve – first by 
its regional Reserve Banks and subsequently by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.79 All such banknotes have served as money, even as only the latter
are accorded legal tender status. All were held not to be in violation of the US
Constitution.
Reflecting on this history, Khan observed that:
Money is a living creature of the market and its form changes to facilitate
commercial transactions in an ever more efficient, convenient, safe manner. 
As such, most innovations in monetary practices are attributable to the
decisions of the market…80 
Accordingly, as far as the banknote is concerned, ‘entrenchment in the legal system
was the affirmation of a simple monetary tradition: the market creates, modifies, and
recreates the concept of money. The law simply recognises and changes, often ex post
facto.’ 81 An obvious takeaway from this is that ‘no legal text, not even the most
authoritative, such as the United States Constitution can fully predict how the future
will discard some of the most obvious paradigms.’82 
<https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript> accessed 7 November
2020
78 Khan, ‘Evolution of Money’ (n 77) 393
79 For a succinct summary see eg Warren E Weber (formerly of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis), ‘Government and Private E-Money Like Systems: Federal Reserve Notes and
National Bank Notes’ (2015) BOC Working Paper 2015-18, 3
<https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/wp2015-18.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2020: ‘Throughout most of U.S. history, bank notes have been issued either solely
by private banks or solely by the government through the Federal Reserve System, the 
central bank.’
80 Khan, ‘Evolution of Money’ (n 77) 396, quoting Cyril James, ‘International Cooperation in
the Field of Money: A Strand of Economic History in Money and the Law 1’ (1945) 1-2 








     
     
   
  
  




     
     
     
 
 
    
   
    
     
 
      
    
      
 
 
   
    
  
 
    
    
 
       
    
   
  
    
 
 
These observations are confirmed by the shifting nature of the banknote - first in
substance, and ultimately, we argue, in form. Principles of law that recognised the
paper banknote, even in the absence of a statute, are good to recognise the e-banknote
as a matter of statutory interpretation of any statute conferring banknote issuing
power.
3 POTENTIAL TECHNICAL DESIGNS OF E-BANKNOTE
SCHEMES
A. Introduction
A digital money that is privately issued is often referred to as ‘virtual currency’.83 This
contrasts with what is known as a ‘central bank digital currency’ or ‘retail CBDC’84 
(‘rCBDC’)85 scheme, where the central bank either issues directly, or possibly fully 
83 See eg Benjamin Geva, ‘Disintermediating Electronic Payments: Digital Cash and Virtual
Currencies’ (2016) 31: 12 JIBLR 661, 664-666, albeit acknowledging that uniform terminology 
is not universally accepted. For the adherence of the ECB to that term in the proposed
meaning, see originally European Central Bank, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes’ (2012) 13 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> accessed
7 November 2020, and as amended in ECB, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes’ (n 27) 25. Finally,
according to Phoebus L Athanassiou, Digital Innovation in Financial Services – Legal Challenges 
and Regulatory Policy Issues (Kluwer Law International BV 2018) 77, ‘virtual currencies” are
‘digital representations of value, which despite not being issued by a central bank or another
public authority, nor “attached” to a fiat currency (subject to notable exceptions) are 
voluntarily accepted by natural or legal persons, as means of exchange, and which are 
stored, transferred and traded electronically, without a tangible, real-world representation’. 
However, we do not share his view that lack of ‘attachment’ to a fiat currency is a normal
feature, as this will exclude claim-checks to fiat currencies or stablecoins. At the same time,
his view on the matter is not unique: denomination in its own unit of account appears to be 
an element in the definition of ‘virtual currency’ (that is, privately issued digital currency) in
He et al, ‘Virtual Currencies’ (n 27) 7
84 Athanassiou, Digital Innovation (n 83) 185 generically defines CBDCs as: ‘centrally issued
digital equivalents of fiat money (…) that are not intended as parallel units of account, which
fulfil some of the functions of money (namely as means of payment and stores of value), and
which can facilitate proximity and long-distant payments alike.’ However, we find the 







   
    
   
  
   
  
       
      
 
 
   
  
     
       
   
  
     
  
 
      
  
  
     
   
   
    
   
     
  
 





      
 
 
   
backs the issuance of, digital currency available to the public at large. Under the first
option, the central bank, as the issuer, may nevertheless delegate functions to the
private sector. Particularly, it may distribute the e-banknotes to the public through
commercial banks and/or other intermediaries, exactly like it presently distributes
physical banknotes. Alternatively, under the second option, a central bank may 
authorise licensed entities, particularly commercial banks, to issue their own 
banknotes, while fully backing them with a 100% reserve of CeBM. Various options
of these architecture and issuance models are discussed in Part 4. This part lays down
design options.
B. Token-Based vs. Account-Based Schemes
In light of the common use of ‘scriptural money’, there is an inclination to address
rCBDC as an amendment to, or correction of, scriptural money, by way of making
scriptural CeBM available to the public at large, rather than only to (large) commercial 
banks. In this context, account-based schemes are discussed as a rCBDC option. In the
simplest sense, such schemes will allow members of the public to hold accounts with
the central bank similar to the accounts held at the central bank by (large) commercial 
banks. 
In Subpart 2 (B), we distinguished between a digital coin and an account-based
product. The former is a distinct entity consisting of data in the form of a unique string
of bits expressing a specified number of units of value. The latter reflects generic
value.86 Anonymity of the payer is easier to instil in a token-based scheme. Indeed, in 
comparison with payment by transferring funds, payment in token-based digital
currency works like payment in cash: ‘[t]he value of the transaction is verified
regardless of the identity of the payer’, even without exposing the payer's hackable
account.87 What matters is the authenticity of the payment objects, rather than the
availability of funds to the payer. Hence, we argue that token-based schemes mimic
the features of banknotes more closely than account-based schemes. 
We also go further and argue that access by the public to CeBM in the form of e-
banknotes, being token-based products, is more beneficial than access to scriptural 
85 A ‘wholesale’ scheme is for the settlement of interbank payment and is outside the scope 
of the present discussion.
86 For discussion of account vs token-based approaches see Bank of England, ‘CBDC’ (n 6)







   
    
 
 
      
 
     
 
 
      
    
 
    
 
     
   
 
 
   
  




    
   
   
   
 
  
   









CeBM, whether or not the latter is viewed as a rCBDC product. Moreover, a token-
based system maximises the advantages to be drawn from new technologies.
The so-called account-based rCBDC schemes are said to fall into two broad categories:
1. ‘Plain sovereign money’88 schemes, under which CeBM becomes available to
members of the public in accounts on the books of the central bank.89 
2. ‘Electronic money’ schemes under which digital devices ‘loaded’ with CeBM
are distributed to the public90 through commercial banks.91 
Both proposals would impose ‘a large administrative burden’ on the central bank that
‘could distract it from its other functions in [regulating] and managing monetary
policy.’ Furthermore, the central bank, ‘a state-owned enterprise’, would undertake
pure market functions, in which it ‘would have no commercial incentive to innovate
88 Beware of inconsistent use of terminology. Andrew Jackson, ‘Sovereign Money - Paving
the Way For a Sustainable Recovery’ (2013) Positive Money <https://positivemoney.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Sovereign-Money-Final-Web.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020 uses
the term to denote central bank money distributed directly and gratuitously to business to
fund infrastructure projects.
89 For now, this is of course contrary to specific statutory limits on the eligibility for holding
an account with the central bank, such as under Article 17 of Protocol (No 4) in the Statute of
the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank [2016] OJ 
C202/230. See also s 18 (1) (l.1) and (l.3) of the Bank of Canada Act (n 12)
90 We suppose such a scheme was implemented in Ecuador, though it is not described with
great precision by Everett Rosenfeld, ‘Ecuador becomes the first country to roll out its own
digitalcash’ CNBC (9 February 2015) < https://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/06/ecuador-becomes-
the-first-country-to-roll-out-its-own-digital-
durrency.html#:~:text=In%202000%2C%20Ecuador%20moved%20to,system%20again%E2%8 
0%94using%20digital%20currencies> accessed 7 November 2020
91 For electronic money, see CPSS, Security of Electronic Money (n 31), particularly at 5. For e-
money redeemed in CoBM, see Tobias Adrian and Tommaso Mancini Griffoli, ‘The Rise of
Digital Money’ (2019) IMF Fintech Note No 19/001, 4 <
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2019/07/12/The-Rise-of-Digital-







    
   
 
     
  
    
   
    





    
 
 
    
     




       




   
 
   
   
  
 
     
 
    
 
  
[payment] services’.92 Accordingly, under a variation of the first proposal, customers'
accounts on the books of the central bank would be operated through, and managed
by, commercial banks.93 
The ECB Digital Euro Report is cognisant of the point. As ‘an electronic form of central 
bank money accessible to all citizens and firms’, and complementing cash and central 
bank deposits, the digital euro is defined by the Report to denote ‘a liability of the
Eurosystem recorded in digital form.’94 This rejects the availability of the digital euro
as a simple deposit with a central bank. At the same time, albeit contradicting itself,
side by side with the token-based option, the Report keeps open the option of an
account-based product that ‘could be implemented by opening accounts directly with
the Eurosystem or through supervised intermediaries.’ 95 
Central bank scriptural money, particularly in the form of ‘sovereign money,’ may not
be easily accessible outside the country of the currency, especially to non-residents.  
Regardless, public access to central bank scriptural money side by side with public
access to commercial bank money could be confusing. At the same time, exclusive
public access to scriptural central bank money has monetary policy implications. In a 
way, it goes to a radically different model of monetary system and banking. Such a 
model was first envisaged a long time ago, albeit as a mode of full-reserve banking,
under which commercial banks maintain 100% reserve of CeBM and do not create
92 Ben Dyson and Graham Hodgson, ‘Digital Cash: Why Central Banks Should Start Issuing
Electronic Money’ (2016) Positive Money, 15 http://positivemoney.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Digital_Cash_WebPrintReady_20160113.pdf accessed 7 November
2020
93 For a precedent from Sri Lanka, albeit for investors' securities accounts operated by
intermediaries on the books of the central bank, see Payment & Settlement Systems Act, No
28 of 2005, Chapter II Securities Accounts, ss 6-10
<https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/laws/acts/en/Payment_settt 
lement_sys_act.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020. This variation differs from the ‘electronic
money scheme’ in envisioning customers’ accounts on the books of the central bank, rather 
than CeBM money booked in a master account  with the central bank and  loaded on
customers’ digital devices.







      
     
      
 
   




      
  
 
   
 
   
  










       
 




   
 
    
   
 
 
    
 
  
        
  
CoBM beyond such reserve.96 An alternative model, under which the public would
have access to CoBM backed by fractional reserve, as well as to either CeBM97 or 
CoBM backed by full reserve, is bound to only confuse the public.
In any event, an ‘account-based [system] (…) uses a reconciliation-intensive, message-
based approach to adjust entries in a ledger’,98 in which ‘the operator of the system
authenticates the sender to ensure authorization to update account balances on a
potentially centralised account ledger.’99 Conversely, since ‘[i]n a token-based system, 
the token contains all information necessary for the recipient to verify the legitimacy
of the transaction (…)[,] the recipient can verify [on his or her own] the object
transferred (i.e., the token)’,100 which brings efficiency gains.
Finally, without an identity tied to it, a figure recorded in a bank's server in the form
of a bit string could easily be changed by a hacker who penetrates into the bank's 
computer.101 ‘It is this very fact that allows a hacker to sneak into the [bank] computer
and alter the figure from $1.00 to $100.00 or to withdraw whatever he wishes.’102 
Conversely, inasmuch as its unique bit string expresses its identity, a digital coin is
less exposed to alteration and is less hackable.103 
96 Patrizio Lainà, ‘Proposals for Full-Reserve Banking: A Historical Survey from David
Ricardo to Martin Wolf’ (2015) 4:2 Economic Thought 1, 12
<http://et.worldeconomicsassociation.org/files/WEA-ET-4-2-Laina.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2020
97 For such a dual system see Dyson & Hodgson, ‘Digital Cash’ (n 92) 25 – 28
98 Digital Dollar Foundation & Accenture, ‘Digital Dollar Project’ (n 21) 10
99 ibid 18
100 ibid 17
101 See in general Martin Carnogursky, ‘Metadata: A Hacker's Best Friend” (Sweepatic Blog, 25 
July 2017) <https://blog.sweepatic.com/metadata-hackers-best-friend/> accessed 7 November
2020
102 Samid, Tethered Money (n 23) 25
103 Even as this risk exists, albeit to a lesser extent, in relation to cryptocurrencies. See eg
Mike Orcutt, ‘Once Hailed as Unhackable, Blockchains Are Now Getting Hacked’














   
  
    
 




   
 
     
  
    
  
     
       
     
  




    






For all these reasons, we are critical of account-based schemes and confine the
subsequent analysis to token-based schemes.
C. rCBDC-Proposals
(i) Forerunners
A few specific central bank cryptocurrency schemes have been floating around.104 In 
the US, proposals have been made for Fedcoin, a central bank-issued, centrally created
cryptocurrency, to be available to the public at large. 105 Digital coins would be 
centrally issued on a blockchain-style decentralised ledger, but nevertheless with the
central bank being in full control of quantity, timing, and fixed value in denominations
of the national fiat currency unit of account. Effectively, transactions would be 
validated by an independent notary nominated by the central bank. 106 A similar
<https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/19/239592/once-hailed-as-unhackable-
blockchains-are-now-getting-hacked/> accessed 7 November 2020
104 See Morten Bech and Rodney Garratt, ‘Central bank cryptocurrencies’ (2017) BIS 
Quarterly Review, 55 <https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1709f.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2020. See also Katrik Hegadekatti, ‘Towards Regional Monetary Unions Through
Blockchain Networks’ (2017) MPRA paper No 82838 <https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/82838/> accessed 7 November 2020; Heike Mai, ‘Why Would We Use Crypto
Euros? Central Bank-Issued Digital Cash – A User Perspective’ (2018) Deutsche Bank




GmBeOh9ffx7iGDKwM7VgffZiG4jDkN7Sk1Sjl6sCVg==> accessed 7 November 2020.
Finally, cf Digital Dollar Foundation & Accenture, 'Digital Dollar Project' (n 21) 11, speaking
of a ‘new transactional infrastructure such as distributed ledger technology’, but failing to
elaborate or be otherwise specific.
105 See eg Wendy McElroy, ‘Fedcoin: The U.S. Will Issue E-Currency That You Will Use’
(Bitcoin, 12 January 2005) <https://news.bitcoin.com/fedcoin-u-s-issue-e-currency/> accessed
7 November 2020
106 Victoria Dodev, ‘On the (Un)Feasibility of Fedcoin: Implementing a Central Bank Backed 
Digital Currency in the United States’ (2018) SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3642880> 






    
   
 
  
   
     
    
   




     
   





    
    
  
    
   
   
  
 





    
 
 




    
   
107 
proposal was made in the UK for RSCoin.107 For its part, interest in FedCoin has 
recently been revived.108 
Another proposal is for a NationCoin, a ‘Regulated and Sovereign Backed 
Cryptocurrency’ (‘RSBC’). The scheme envisages cryptocoins, which as with Bitcoin,
would be created by, and transacted over, a blockchain. Upon their creation,
cryptocoins would be stored and released to the public by a Digital Asset Reserve as
RSBC, at the fixed value of the national unit of account. Transactions would be verified
by ‘miners’ who would be paid freshly minted cryptocoins.109 
(ii) Libra110 
Proponents of cryptocurrencies are attracted to the amenability of a rCBDC regulated
by blockchain to an algorithmic monetary policy. 111 A prominent cryptocurrency
project is that of the most recent version of Libra, under which a single-currency
stablecoin is backed by a reserve consisting of cash or cash equivalent in the given
See George Danezis and Sarah Meiklejohn, ‘Centrally Banked Cryptocurrencies’
(2015) University College London <https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/502.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2020. In part, this article is too technical to the uninitiated in computer science 
and related subjects (including myself). ‘RSCoin is the core of a system of scalable and
auditable transactions, not a full product’ which thus could be used as a basis for either a
retail or wholesale product (Email message to the author from George Danezis, dated 4
December 2017).
108 See eg Ann Saphir, ‘Fedcoin? The U.S. Central Bank Is Looking Into It” (Reuters, 5 
February 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-brainard/fedcoin-the-u-s-
central-bank-is-looking-into-it-idUSKBN1ZZ2XF> accessed 7 November 2020
109 Kartik Hegadekatti and Yatish S G, ‘Generation, Security and Distribution of NationCoins 
by a Sovereign Authority’ (2016) SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888347> accessed 7
November 2020
110 See eg Philipp Sandner et al, “The Digital Programmable Euro, Libra and CBDC: 
Implications for European Banks” (2020) SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3663142> accessed
7 November 2020
111 See eg Jack Solowey, ‘Digital Delegation Doctrine: Central Bank Digital Currencies and






   
     
   
    









   
  














   
    
 
       
 





     
    
currency and in the full amount of the issue.112 Being in essence a private global
stablecoin initiative, its infrastructure is available for a rCBDC.113 
To facilitate agreement among all validator nodes on the ledger transactions, the Libra
Blockchain adopted the Libra Byzantine Fault Tolerance (LibraBFT) consensus
protocol:
The main guarantee provided in this approach is resilience against to Byzantine
failures – preventing individual faults from contaminating the entire system.
LibraBFT is designed to mask any deviation from correct behavior in a third of
the participants. These cover anything from a benign bit flipping in a node's 
storage to fully compromising a server by stealing its secret keys.114 
Thus, even if up to one third of the network-validated nodes are compromised or fail,
BFT consensus is designed to function correctly. This class of consensus protocols
enable high transactions throughput, low latency, and a more energy-efficient
approach to consensus than the ‘proof of work’ protocol used in some other
blockchains. For its part, the Libra Association pledges it will perform due diligence
on prospective validators.
Previous blockchain projects view the blockchain as a collection of blocks of
transactions. Conversely, the Libra Blockchain will be a single data structure that
records the history of transactions. At the same time, in order to securely store
transactions, data on the Libra Blockchain will be protected by Merkle trees, a data 
structure used by other blockchains that enables the detection of any changes to 
existing data.115 
112 For details see ‘Libra White Paper v2.0’ (Libra, April 2020) <https://libra.org/en-US/white-
paper/> accessed 7 November 2020, on which the discussion below relies.
113 Libra White Paper Paper v2.0 (n 112) s 04; ECB, ‘Digital Euro Report’ (n 6) 12
114 The LibraBFT Team, ‘State Machine Replication in the Libra Blockchain’, 2 
<https://developers.libra.org/docs/state-machine-replication-paper> accessed 7 November 
2020, modified to incorporate updates to the Libra payment system as found in the White 
Paper v2.0 (n 112)
115 For ‘merkle tree’ being a transaction data linked together with hash references in a turned












   
   
   
  
    
   












   
 
 
        
  
 




      




    
  
In the Libra payment process, transactions will be signed cryptographically so that
even if all validators are compromised, no falsified transactions from addresses with
secure signature keys can be accepted as committed.
(iii) WingCash116 
WingCash’ s proposal is for a non-blockchain-based rCBDC. In 2015, the United States
Federal Reserve established a 331-member Faster Payments Task Force to support a
broader effort to improve the speed, safety, and efficiency of payments.117 On March
29, 2016, McKinsey & Company was selected to support Faster Payments Task Force
efforts to assess faster payments solution proposals from various providers across the
United States payments industry. 118 Among the 17 faster payments solutions,
WingCash tied for first place.119 Its proposal is described as:
A software platform that would be owned and operated by the Federal Reserve
and the Governing Organization.120 The Federal Reserve would issue digital
currency (digital Fed notes) and is tied to the Internet domain (Fednotes.com).
This faster payment solution proposal ‘seek[s] to make it possible for any entity to
transfer value electronically using methods that seek to preserve and to emulate
physical currency.’ Accordingly, its Faster Payments Network (FPN) would allow
116 WingCash is now Open Payment Network (n 62). The proposal discussed here was put 
forward by it under its original name and hence we refer to the design under that name.
117 Federal Reserve System, ‘Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System’ (2015)
<https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/strategies-improving-us-
payment-system.pdf> 7 November 2020
118 Federal Reserve (Press Release), ‘Federal Reserve Engages in Effort to Access Faster
Payments Solutions’ (Federal Reserve, 29 March 2016)
<https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20160329a.htm> 7 
November 2020
119 See Faster Payments Task Force, ‘The U.S. Path to Faster Payments – Final Report Part
Two: A Call to Action’ (2017) 13 < https://fasterpaymentstaskforce.org/wp-
content/uploads/faster-payments-task-force-final-report-part-two.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2020
120 Defined in the Glossary as ‘[t]he executive officers, board of directors and board of











   
 
 
    
   
 
   
  
    
    
    
   
   
   
   
  




   
   
   
   
   




     
  
 
   
 
   
… the FPN specifies a single Internet domain (…) where the Federal Reserve 
publishes digital bills and coins (Fed notes). Each Fed note is a unique web page
with an immutably assigned URL that includes both a currency code (e.g.,
USD) and a unique identifier similar to a serial number (…). Combined these
components form a unique immutable address for each Fed note …
The Fed notes would constitute legal tender so as to be the equivalent of US physical
currency. ‘[E]ach Fed note is assigned a single, permanent, monetary unit of value’ as 
well as ‘a field that stores the URL of the issuer (…) and a field that stores the URL of
the current holder ….’122 Each Fed note would be cryptographically ‘signed’ by the
‘Fed’ using ‘asymmetric (public key) cryptography’ (PKC), with the Fed also acting as
the Certificate Authority (CA). Fed notes would be transferred by means of an
exchange of cryptographically ‘signed’ messages from the payer to the Fed (with a
copy to the payee), followed by a message from the Fed to the payee. With the
completion of each payment, the FPN would update the ‘possession’ of attribute of
the Fed note from the payer to the payee. In the process, the Fed would thus act not
only as the issuer, but also as a controller of the Internet domain associated with each
Fed note and as a custodian of the transfer record.
The WingCash proposed solution envisages the use by the Fed of the WingCash
platform. It is a platform that allows a safe and secure transfer of value among
individuals and businesses. The Network has two distinct parts: one allowing the
Treasury to design and issue digital Fed notes and the second to be operated by the
‘persons and businesses to hold and transfer digital Fed notes for payment, with the
direction of payment flow from the Payer directly to the Payee.’
Thus,121 
Fed (either directly or through a Governing Organization). The latter would consist of
a global directory service distributing the digital notes and recording their transfer.
Initial distribution would be made by the Fed to banks, which would make the digital
121 WingCash (Proposer), ‘Faster Payments QIAT’ (2017) Solution Proposal – Faster Payment 
Task Force, 11, 14
<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_CNPQWTRQwuZWhqbDUzNVJsNGc/view> accessed 7 












   
 
 
    






   
  
 
     
  
        
 
 
     
     
    
    
    













notes available for withdrawals to their customers. Both successful competition and
interoperability with existing networks such as ACH and cards is anticipated.
(iv) BitMint
BitMint money, developed by BitMint, was identified as ‘the only candidate
qualifying as a universal digital representation of worldwide currencies.’123 Its digital 
currency, unlike all known cryptocurrencies, does not rely on algorithms that could 
be cracked by quantum computers. Having considered different strategies, BitMint
chose quantum-grade randomness as the basis for future currencies. Each coin has a
unique identity; however, the identity of the bits does not determine the value of the
coin. The value of the coin is determined by payload string. The identity string and
the payload string are based on pure randomness and are fused together, inseparably. 
A coin trader can extract a substring, containing an identity string and payload string,
and pass it to another, as payment.
Users receive a coin to their device like a text message. They can then split the coin to
make payment for any sum up to the sum of the coin. Payment is carried out by 
directly transmitting the bits that comprise the coin split to the payee's device under
any communication method, without real time intervention of any remote server.
Thus, BitMint facilitates continuous payment simultaneously made in real time
during the purchase – as for example, when a buyer fills his or her car’s fuel tank at a 
gas station.
Having a unique identity, a coin can be made tethered money, so that it is possible to
tie to it terms of use, an expiration date, an intended purpose, a time of payment, or a 
designated redeemer.124 In addition, the BitMint digital money framework enables
uninterrupted payment online and offline (the latter meaning it is not dependent on
network availability), 125 that fits centralised or decentralised regimen, and allows
peer-to-peer payments – all of which makes it fit to become legal tender.
123 Helmut Scherzer, ‘Chapter 36: On the Quest to the Ultimate Digital Money’ in Claudia
Linnhoff-Popien, Ralf Schneider, and Michael Zaddach, Digital Marketplaces Unleashed.
(Springer 2018) 36.6. 
124 Samid, Tethered Money (n 23) 108. See at 50, where the author discusses tethering as a way
to protect the holder of BitMint coins in case the digital device on which they are held is
stolen. We should, however, observe that whether this will protect the dispossessed owner







     
   





   
  
  
   
  
   
    







   
  
 
   
 
   
   
  
    
     
 
 
   
   
 




       
 
BitMint is centrally minted. Its rCBDC solution is a digital-fiat currency claim-check
to a defined quantity of a specific commodity, including a fiat currency.126 It can be
issued either directly by a central bank127 or by a private issuer such as a commercial
bank,128 ideally holding 100% reserve.
BitMint digital currency may be operated either as a unified global digital money
platform or decentralised, in a system in which each central bank operates its own
CBDC mint. Central banks can, however, choose any distribution and/or
authentication channel, whether of BitMint's delegated authentication solution or
delegated to ‘designated dealers’, such as commercial banks, delegated Mints and/or
distributed ledgers network (eg blockchain, Ethereum). When authenticating on a
distributed ledger, only the identity of the coin is exposed; there is no need to expose
the value, such as when authenticating cryptocurrencies. When several central banks
of various countries launch their own respective rCBDC, or if one large country
chooses to authorise several local Mints, there will be full interoperability through
BitMint's InterMint.129 
BitMint's technology enables controlled privacy, from full anonymity to full
traceability and anything in between, in compliance with regulatory requirements in
125 We thus do not use the term ’offline’ in its more common sense, namely, delayed
authentication, as for example in ‘Offline Payments’ (Chargebee)
<https://www.chargebee.com/docs/offline_payments.html> accessed 7 November 2020,
where offline payments are defined to mean ‘transactions processed asynchronously.’
126 For detailed information on BitMint see eg ‘BitMint’ (website homepage)
<http://www.bitmint.com/> accessed 7 November 2020; ‘BitMint’ (Start-Up Nation Central) 
<http://finder.startupnationcentral.org/company_page/bitmint/> accessed 7 November 2020
and sites and videos accessible through it; ‘BitMInt – Identity Bearing Money’ (Medium –
BitMint News) <https://medium.com/@bitmintnews> accessed 7 November 2020 and articles
thereunder
127 For details, see Gideon Samid, ‘Bitcoin.BitMint: Reconciling Bitcoin with Central Banks’ 
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/244.pdf> accessed 7 November 2020
128 DigFin (Banking & Payments), ‘Q-Pay Could Mark the Next Sea Change in Finance’
(DigFinGroup, 8 January 2019) <https://www.digfingroup.com/bitmint-q-pay/> accessed 7 
November 2020










    
  
    














   
      
     
   
     
   
 
    









   
 
 
   
each jurisdiction. The coin itself can carry its chain of custody (optional) that can be
bypassed only by court order. 130 Each coin is equipped with smart contracts
capabilities. Through its quantum randomness generation process, distribution
management model, and technical architecture, BitMint retains the basic
characteristics of having quantum security, resisting counterfeiting, and discouraging
money laundering. This eliminates, or at least substantially reduces, the possibility of
misuse or participation in illegal acts, while also protecting individuals' privacy rights.
BitMint is inoculated against quantum attack because it is vaccinated with quantum
randomness as the critical ingredient for construction of a comprehensive financial
platform. That platform is designed to move and store money quickly, efficiently,
conveniently, and securely. Not being a cryptocurrency, BitMint is not underlined by
complex cryptographic algorithms that may crash against quantum computers.
(v) Assessment
The ECB Digital Euro Report stresses that the digital euro is neither a crypto asset nor
a stablecoin.131 However, this statement ought to be taken with a grain of salt. We take
its first part to mean that the digital euro will not be a self-anchored cryptocurrency
such as Bitcoin, since the Report does not preclude a claim-check cryptocurrency. The
second part means that the digital euro will not be a claim to the euro, but rather a
euro of its own. However, this is the same as saying that the paper banknote is not a
promise to pay money, but is money. Accordingly, we do not understand the ECB
Digital Euro Report to reject an e-banknote promising to pay in euro. Nor do we take
the Report to reject (or provide reasons for the rejection of) a cryptocurrency along the
lines of Libra.
Our own assessment is that a public digital currency in the form of a cryptocurrency, 
even if it is a claim-check/stablecoin, has a few drawbacks from both a legal and a
technological perspective. In a cryptocurrency, the coin consists of the total available
in the wallet. Stated otherwise, a coin is not handled as a unique and separate entity
from the beginning of a payment transaction to its end. Finality of payment is also less 
clear in a DLT-based system. Furthermore, in a cryptocurrency, the sequence of the
130 See eg Gideon Samid, ‘BitMint: Non-Speculative Digital Currency (The Future of Money)’
(Youtube, 7 August 2014) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5UfpW1kS4Y> accessed 7
November 2020






   
  
  
   
 
 
   
  
  
   
    
  
    
  
     





     
   
    








   
   
 
    
 
   
   
 
    
    
bits represents the value of the coin. Since it is unique to each coin, it is that sequence 
Thus, while substantially enhanced through the use of smartphones and Internet,
BitMint payments may be made over simple mobile phones over the cellular network. 
When using more sophisticated devices, proximity BitMint payments, which may be
badly needed in emergency situations, can be made even without any communication
network. For example, the payer’s device may generate a QR code133 of which the
payee’s device takes a picture, thereby completing the payment. A payment may also 
be made via NFC, 134 which most smart phones possess. Finally, trust facilitating 
which gives the coin its identity. Accordingly, insofar as each coin in WingCash and
BitMint has both an identity and a specific value, as separate functions and from the
beginning of the transaction to its end, among the three designs we presented, they
both stand closer to the paper banknote.
The WingCash coin, being a digital representation of the fiat currency banknote, is
closest to the paper banknote. At the same time, the BitMint payment transaction
better assimilates payment in cash, as it does not require any intermediation. BitMint
also facilitates a continuous payment, coin splitting, and tethering. Furthermore, a
unique key feature of BitMint, which is not reported to exist for the others, is the lack
of complete dependence not only on the Internet, but also on any communication
network. As such, it appears to meet a universal access requirement,132 implying a 
degree of independence from a communication network, particularly the Internet.
This facilitates access by unbanked people and non-holders of digital devices, as well
as access in case of network failure, particularly in a disaster situation. Thereby,
BitMint payment is assimilated to the payment in physical banknotes.
132 See eg John Miedema et al, ‘Designing a CBDC for Universal Access’ (2020) BOC Staff 
Analytical Note 2020-10 <https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/06/staff-analytical-note-2020-
10/> accessed 7 November 2020
133 ‘QR codes’, short for ‘quick response’ codes, are square-shaped black-and-white symbols 
that people can scan using a smartphone to learn more about a product. These encrypted
squares can hold links, coupons, event details, and other information that users might want 
to take with them for referring to later: Corey Wainwright, ‘How to Make a QR Code in 8 
Easy Steps’(HubSpot Blog, last edited 14 July 2020)
<https://blog.hubspot.com/blog/tabid/6307/bid/29449/how-to-create-a-qr-code-in-4-quick-
steps.aspx > accessed 7 November 2020
134 NFC (Near field communication) is ‘a method of wireless data transfer … that detects and
then enables technology in close proximity to communicate without the need for an internet 
connection’: Cameron Faulkner, ‘What is NFC? Everything You Need to Know’ (TechRadar, 






      
    
     
        
   
   
   
    
  
   
 
 
   
     
  
    
    
   
 
 
   
 
   








   
 
       
       
     
 
payment may be generated by the payee’s inspection of a Hard Wallet containing the
money. The Hard Wallet is a physical device that can dispense identity-bearing digital
currency. It could be either an independent device, serving unbanked or underbanked
people as well as people with no mobile phone, or a chip embedded in a smart phone,
but working offline. Payment issued from the Hard Wallet can be taken in by a second
Hard Wallet, which will further pay to another Hard Wallet, creating a payment 
ecology of digital money for long periods without the benefit of a communication
network.135 Therewith, ‘[a]ll that the payee has to do is to attach a simple measuring
device to the physical wallet, take instant measurements and compare them to the pre-
loaded figures published by the manufacturer. If the two sources agree, the payee is
satisfied, and regards the bits that subsequently flow out from this wallet as bona fide
money.’136 
At the moment, blockchain technology seems to lead the way in CBDC research and
projects.137 However, it remains to be seen, regardless of legal interpretation, whether
a DLT-based CBDC can provide the required quantum security, speed, and scalability
to grow into a replacement of physical cash, being a legal tender and an enabler for
fee-free, frictionless, instantaneous, and unconditional money transfer with legal
finality of value between any two parties.
135 For a scientific exposition see Gideon. Samid, ‘BitMint Hard Wallet: Digital Payment
without Network Communication : No Internet, yet Sustained Payment Regimen between
Randomness-Verifiable Hard Wallets ‘ (IEEE International IOT, Electronics and
Mechatronics Conference (IEMTRONICS), Vancouver, BC, Canada 2020) 1-7
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9216456> accessed 7 November 2020
136 Gideon Samid, ‘Security Notes: Digital Transactions without the Internet’ (Digital 
Transactions, 1 October 2020)
<https://www.digitaltransactions.net/magazine_articles/security-notes-digital-transactions-
without-the-internet/> accessed 7 November 2020
137 See eg Philipp Sandner, ‘The Digital, Programmable Euro: Statement by the FinTech
Council of the German Federal Ministry of Finance (Unofficial Translation)’ (Medium, 30 July
2020) <https://medium.com/@philippsandner/the-digital-programmable-euro-5c1c0b39ae2c> 
accessed 7 November 2020. See also Raphael Auer, Giulio Cornelli, and Jon Frost, ‘Rise of
the Central Bank Digital Currencies: Drivers, Approaches and Technologies’ (2020)












    
    
 
    
  





   
    
 
     
 
    
   




    
  
      
 
 
     
 
     
  
 
    
     
    
 
   
  
4 ARCHITECTURE AND ISSUANCE MODELS
A. Introduction
The  e-banknote, being a digital coin
 from payers to payees. This 
We read statutory powers to issue banknotes138 to include the power to redeem them.
We also assume the existence of central banks’ powers to address mechanisms for the
powers to exist.
 previous discussion established that an
containing a promise to pay the bearer a sum certain in money, is a ‘banknote.’
Accordingly, e-banknotes may be issued by a central bank under its statutory powers
to issue banknotes. The discussion further presented designs that may serve as e-
banknotes and assessed their suitability. However, a simple truism is that the use of
banknotes, whether in paper or digital format, requires mechanisms to make them
available to, and usable by, the public. Thus, paper banknotes issued by the central
bank are purchased by and physically delivered to commercial banks, which 
effectively sell them to their customers, to whom they are physically delivered at 
branches and ATMs. In turn, the customers use them in payment by physically
delivering them part addresses corresponding
mechanisms that ought to be established for the issuance, distribution, redemption
of, and payment in, e-banknotes.
transfer of, and payment in, banknotes, which are particularly relevant in the case of
e-banknotes. Such powers to distribute and run a transfer system may be seen as either
incidental to the banknote issuance power or part of the powers that exist in relation
to the payment system.139 The ensuing discussion on rCBDC models assumes such
rCBDC models are often divided into direct, hybrid, and indirect. 140 In the direct
model, the central bank issues the digital euros and runs its transfer system.141 At this 
point, in a hybrid system, the central bank then issues its digital euros to the public,
138 Eg those cited in n 1, 2, and 4.
139 As in eg the EU under Article 127(2) TFEU, as further implemented by Article 22 of the 
ESCB/ECB Statute (n 89)
140 See eg ECB, ‘Digital Europ Report’ (n 6) 39-41; Raphael Auer & Rainer Böhme, ‘The
Technology of Retail Central Bank Digital Currency’ (2020) BIS Quarterly Review 88-93
<https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2003j.pdf > accessed 7 November 2020












   
 
      
      
    
  
   
 
 
   
 
    




    
 
    




     
 
      
  
       




      
 
     
  
but the distribution and transfer system is run by intermediaries.142 Under the indirect
model, the central bank issues the currency to intermediaries, which issue to the
public their own currency, fully backed by the central bank issued currency. Those
intermediaries also run the inter-customer transfer system.
We do not fully adopt this classification, together with its terminology. In our view, it
is not adequately fine-tuned to take into account all reasonable scenarios. Particularly,
it focuses strongly on the transfer of e-banknotes, while addressing their distribution
to the public in a rather rudimentary way. It also does not take into account the option
of having commercial banks act on behalf of the central bank in issuing e-banknotes.
Further, especially concerning hybrid models, a distinction between intermediated
and direct distribution to end-users is missing – and thus developed by the authors
here.
While as a rule, commercial banks are not authorised to issue legal tender banknotes, 
we see a role for them and acknowledge that the greater their role in the architecture, 
the more space becomes available for autonomy, and thus competition, as well as
innovation, albeit at the cost of a greater need for interoperability. For simplicity’s
sake, we also assume that under each option, redemption is exactly the reverse
operation of issuance. 
B. Issuance (and Redemption) Options
Under the first four scenarios outlined here, a member of the public holding an e-
banknote has a direct claim against the central bank.
(i) Full direct option
Both the distribution and transfer system are run by the central bank.
In this scenario, the central bank deals directly with e-banknote holders.143 Holders
purchase e-banknotes directly from the central bank, typically paying out of bank
accounts or, in theory, in paper banknotes. The central bank runs a comprehensive
network linking all e-banknote holders. As with any of the other systems set out below,
142 ECB, ‘Digital Euro Report’ (n 6) 41, Figure 4 and ‘intermediated’ model in Auer et al (n 
137) 20
143 As it does not involve intermediaries, this model has no corresponding model in ECB. 






    
 
 
   
 
      
 
 
   
    
 
    
   
    
     
  
 




       
 














    
 
    
 
this option does not require the opening or use of accounts in a central bank by
members of the public.
(ii) Limited direct option
Distribution is run by commercial banks, while the transfer system is operated by the central
bank.
As far as distribution is concerned, this scenario mimics the current system for paper
banknotes.144 Commercial banks buy e-banknotes from the central bank, paying out
of their reserve accounts. Commercial bank customers purchase e-banknotes (issued
by the central bank) from their own commercial banks and typically pay for them by
having their respective accounts with their commercial bank debited. As in Subpart
4(B)(i), a holder of an e-banknote has a direct relationship with the issuing central
bank. Moreover, as in Subpart 4(B)(i), the central bank runs a comprehensive network
linking all e-banknote holders.
(iii) Hybrid-intermediated option
Both the distribution and transfer system are operated by commercial banks.
This option replicates the scenario discussed in Subpart 4(B)(ii), with the exception
that the inter-customer transfer system is also run by commercial banks (rather than
the central bank).145 As in Subpart 4(B)(ii), commercial banks buy e-banknotes from
the central bank. Upon the issuance of an e-banknote to the commercial bank, the
reserve account of the commercial bank at the central bank is debited. Commercial
bank customers purchase e-banknotes (issued by a central bank) from their own
commercial banks and typically pay by having their respective accounts with their
commercial bank debited.
(iv) Hybrid-direct option
Both the distribution and transfer system are operated by commercial banks.
144 This model is comparable to the one used in ECB, ‘Digital Euro Report’ (n 6) 40, Figure 3
145 This model is comparable to the one used in ibid 41, Figure 4 (the latter however does not 






     
     
  
   
 








      
  
    
     
    




     
     
     
  
 





   





    
  
 
Unlike in the scenario set out in Subpart 4(B)(iii), commercial banks issue the e-
banknotes as agents for the central bank. Upon the issuance of an e-banknote to the
holder, the reserve account of the (‘issuing’) commercial bank at the central bank is
debited. This scenario differs from the option addressed in Subpart 4(B)(iii) in
facilitating the issuance of e-banknotes by one or more commercial banks on behalf of
the central bank. The task delegated to a commercial bank is purely ministerial and
does not involve policy choices. Instead, the issuing commercial bank acts strictly as
instructed by the delegating central bank.
(v) Backed option
Both the distribution and transfer system are operated by commercial banks.
In contrast to the four scenarios above, a holder of an e-banknote does not have a
direct claim against the central bank. At the same time, as long as the system runs
properly, the holder has the security of full backing by the central bank, as if the e-
banknote was issued by the central bank itself. While we assume that an e-banknote
issued by a commercial bank is not legal tender, it is redeemable (ie payable) in legal
tender, namely banknotes (whether in paper or electronic form) issued by the central
bank.
In this scenario, authorised commercial banks issue e-banknotes in their own names
so that each commercial bank has a direct relationship under each e-banknote with
the respective holder. The latter will not be in privity with the central bank. However,
to the extent that the e-banknotes are fully backed by CeBM, the chance is that they
circulate as monetary objects in discharge of payment obligations. What is envisaged
in the scenario is not a system of private issuance of fiduciary digital currencies.146 
Hence, issues identified in the old system, under which paper banknotes were issued
by commercial banks as a form of CoBM,147 are not anticipated to arise.
146 With regard to which we recognise the need for government intervention as in Ben Fung,
Scott Hendry and Warren E Webber, ‘Swedish Riksbank Notes and Enskilda Bank Notes: 
Lessons for Digital Currencies’ (2018) BOC Staff Working Paper 2018-27
<https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/swp2018-27.pdf> accessed 7
November 2020
147 The experience with the old system is discussed by Ben Fung, Scott Hendry, Warren E
Weber, ‘Canadian Bank Notes and Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies’ (2017)
BOC Staff Working Paper 2017-5 <https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-






    
  





    
 
       
    
        
    
 
 
        
    
    






     






   
  
 




    
      
 
In fact, this model mimics the issuance of written banknotes in the UK by a few
designated banks in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 148 Such banknotes are not
accorded legal tender status, but are accepted in payment as a matter of practice.149 By 
law, these banknotes are required to be fully backed by earmarked sterling obligations
of the Bank of England. 150 Similarly, in the scenario envisaged under this option, 
commercial banks may be authorised to issue e-banknotes, fully backed by CeBM.
C. Final Observations
1. In all scenarios, the central bank keeps its position as a facilitator or catalyst, as
well as an overseer (or even regulator), of the claim-check e-banknote system.151 
Only in the scenarios set out in Subparts 4(B)(i) and 4(B)(ii), where the central
bank is involved to one degree or another in distribution and transfer, will it
also be an operator or direct provider.
2. Operationally, the scenarios set out in Subparts 4(B)(iv) and 4(B)(v) may be the
same. In each case, a commercial bank earmarks funds from its reserve account
with its central bank, against which it issues the e-banknotes. However, in each
such scenario, the legal implications of the central bank’s liability and legal
tender status are quite different.
148 See Banking Act 2009 (UK) pt 6, particularly s 213. For HM Treasury Consultation
Document see HM Treasury, ‘Banknote issue arrangements in Scotland and Northern 




149 See eg Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘The Status of Scottish and Northern Irish Banknotes’
(2008) Briefing Note 122/08 <http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/io/research/2008/12208.pdf> 
accessed 7 November 2020
150 Scottish and Northern Ireland Banknote Regulations 2009, SI 2009/3056 issued by the
Treasury under ss 215-220 of the Banking Act 2009 (UK)
151 For these central bank functions in the payment system see in general Ben Fung, Miguel
Molico, and Gerald Stuber, ‘Electronic Money and Payments: Recent Developments and
Issue’ (2014) BOC Staff Discussion Paper 2014-2, 19 < https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-






     
      
    
   
         
   




      
        
  
 
     
     
    







    
 
   
   
 
   
   
    




    
  
 
3. While in the scenarios discussed in Subparts 4(B)(iv)and 4(B)(v), commercial
banks’ funds in their reserve account are earmarked, in the scenarios addressed
in Subparts 4(B)(ii) and 4(B)(iii), a commercial bank uses such funds to pay its
central bank for the e-banknotes to be purchased. The difference appears to be
that in the scenarios dealt with in Subparts 4(B)(iv) and 4(B)(v), funds are
debited from the reserve account only upon the redemption of each e-banknote,
while in the scenarios discussed in Subparts 4(B)(ii) and 4(B)(iii), funds are
debited to the commercial bank’s reserve account as soon as the e-banknotes 
are purchased.
4. Commercial banks’ reserve funds at the central bank are not involved in the
scenario addressed in Subpart 4(B)(i). In that scenario, a holder ‘purchases’ the
e-banknote directly from the issuing commercial bank.
5. In the final analysis, the scenario addressed in Subpart 4(B)(iii) - that of the
hybrid intermediated option, under which both distribution and transfers of
an e-banknote issued by the central bank are run by commercial banks - may
be the most advantageous. This is so because it implements an optimal balance
between a visible holder’s claim against the central bank and the maximum
operational role for commercial banks.
5 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, as a matter of law, a token-based e-banknote is a ‘banknote’. While it 
is beyond the expertise of the authors to assess the reliability of technologies
available for a complying e-banknote, a survey and proper explanation of existing
designs and potential architectural models, as undertaken in this article, is essential
for the selection of the desired e-banknote scheme.
On the basis of technological information publicly disseminated, subject to
verification to be undertaken by technology experts, this article has pointed to the
preferability of a centrally issued design based on quantum-grade randomness and
available offline. An architecture premised on a hybrid-intermediated option, under
which both distribution and transfers of an e-banknote issued by the central bank are
run by commercial banks, appears to be the most advantageous. It gives the e-
banknote holders a direct claim against the central bank, while capitalising on the
expertise, infrastructure, and innovative potential of commercial banks, with a view









   
 
 
    
    
    














Two final observations bear mentioning. First, while ‘monetary sovereignty’ allows
each jurisdiction to move on its own in selecting and implementing its preferred e-
banknote scheme, the global economy will be enhanced enormously by the adoption
of a universal design and model, which will afford a high degree of interoperability 
and facilitate a smooth operation of foreign exchange markets. Second, we strongly
recommend that the selection of the desired design and model, whether locally or
universally, should be made in the context of the existing economic order and should
not be used to leverage agendas of new economic orders such as, for example, the use
of Bitcoin by libertarians. An agenda for a new economic order is unlikely to generate
the consensus required on both the national and global level for the selection of an
optimal design and model.
Inasmuch as a professional and apolitical process is recommended, our preference is
to leave the tasks of selecting and implementing a rCBDC scheme to central banks. To 
that end, central banks’ ability to rely on existing statutory provisions in selecting and
implementing the optimal design and model, as demonstrated in this article, is a step
in the right direction.
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